Fields of Sense

 Within the layers and spheres described in Hartmann's architecture for critical ontology there is scope for introducing further structure. A Field of Sense [1] is an organisational concept that can be employed within a layer or within a sphere. It will be seen below that within the critical ontology adopted from Hartmann that Gabriel's full ontology cannot be accepted but a Field of Sense remains as a useful structure.

A Field of Sense is a domain in which objects appear in relationship to each other. How objects relate to each other depends on the properties that they have. Take, for example, the tendency for a cube of ice to melt while lying on a table in a warm living room. In this example, the living room is a Field of Sense in which the table, the warm air and the ice cube appear. The living room itself can in turn be an object in a Field of Sense such as a house. In `the house' Field of Sense the living room can have the properties of being warm and having a table in it.

For Gabriel the mode of existence of an object and its properties depends on the Field of Sense that grants that mode. In that ontology, to exist is for something to appear in a Field of Sense, roughly; to exist is to belong to a domain in which objects appear.

The notion of sense here is developed by Gabriel from that of Frege [2], whose use of `sense' is close to grasping the meaning of the term when restricting considerations to a concept. It is generalised by Gabriel to grasping how an object appears in the context that makes that appearance possible. This grasping is generalised further to being affected by the appearance of an object. This form of `grasping' need not be cognitive. To use the example Frege employs; the morning star and evening star are two senses of the proper name Venus. Frege uses epistemological terms, but these can be reinterpreted ontologically, as follows. The existent thing, Venus, can appear in two senses, as the morning star and as the evening star. There are, of course, many other ways for Venus to appear. The object Venus viewed from the earth in the morning is the morning star. The morning star exists. Existence for Gabriel is not found immediately in the world but in one of many domains. Such a domain is a Field of Sense. There are many such domains, a potentially uncountable infinity. Things make sense and are sensed in such a domain.

For Gabriel the world (the systematic totality of all that exists) is the Field of Sense of all Fields of Sense. His negative result (that the world does not exist) depends on this notion. The Field of Sense ontology may be organised compactly as follows,

• Existence implies that properties appear in a Field of Sense 
• A sense is the way in which an object appears. 
• A Field of Sense can be an object in yet another Field of Sense.
• A Field of Sense must contain objects and cannot consist exclusively of a single object because an object could not then appear because appearance is always in relationship to something.
• The world cannot be an object in a Field of Sense otherwise it would appear in a field larger than the world. 
• But to exist is to appear in a Field of Sense. 
• Therefore, The world does not exist.
• The physical universe, people, scientific theories, characters in novels, and films all exist in at least one Field of Sense.
• Fields of Sense are differentiated by reference (as developed by Frege [2]). 
• Reference enables recognition of the Field of Sense in which objects are appearing. For example, it would be a reference mistake to identify your family life with a TV play, but it would not be a reference mistake to use it as a metaphor.

Although this has a form of a useful and in many ways enlightening organisational scheme it assumes that existence implies appearance or even the stronger claim that existence is appearance [3]. Although all objects of interest to physical science will appear in a Field of Sense there is no compelling reason to think that all entities must appear in a field of sense or that appearance exhausts what is meant by existing. There may be entities that are inaccessible, that leave no trace. There may be entities that have no scope to appear per se and the world, as the systematic totality of all that exists, is a candidate to be such an entity. From these considerations a modification of the scheme above is proposed:

• The properties of all objects appear in a Field of Sense
• A sense is the way in which an object appears. 
• A Field of Sense can be an object in yet another Field of Sense.
• A Field of Sense must contain objects and cannot consist exclusively of a single object because an object could not then appear because appearance is always in relationship to something.
• The world cannot be an object in a Field of Sense otherwise it would appear in a field larger than the world. 
• But to be an object is to appear in a Field of Sense.
• Therefore, the world is not an object.
• The physical universe, people, scientific theories, characters in novels, and films all exist in at least one Field of Sense.
• Fields of Sense are differentiated by reference.
• Reference enables recognition of the Field of Sense in which objects are appearing.

So, the headline result of Gabriel's ontological analysis (The World does not Exist) is gone and replace by "The World is not an Object". This is not in any way paradoxal because an entity becomes and object in relation to another outside entity and for the world there is no such entity.

Fields of Sense allow aspects of ontological investigation to be pursued within and across Hartmann's strata and in in both ontic spheres.

[1] Markus Gabriel. Fields of Sense. A New Realist Ontology. Edinburgh University, 2015.

[2] Gottlob Frege. Funktion, Begriff, Bedeutung: Fünf logische Studien. Ed. by Günther Patzig. Hubert & Co, 1962.

[3] Markus Gabriel. Fiktionen. Suhrkamp Verlag, 2020.

Why critical ontology?

"The 'being' of things is indifferent to whatever things might be 'for someone'."

Nicolai Hartmann asked "How is a critical ontology at all possible?" [1].  He was writing at a time when metaphysics was under attack or being dismissed as irrelevant. Part of his answer was that ontology, properly structured, is more like a a science of what exists than speculative metaphysics. But what purpose does it serve? The short answer is that critical ontology is a way of investigating what exists and how it exists and that this must be considered before investigating how things behave. Hartmann's writings on ontology [2], [3], [4], [5], developed the answer further. In addition to taking seriously the phenomena of normal life and natural science, he examines in detail the history of ontology. Hartmann's critical historical examination, ranging from the pre-socratics to his contemporaries such as Heidegger, leads him to classify many approaches as mistaken in not addressing existence as such but merely the appearance or knowledge of things or packing everything in the realm of ideas or physical substance.

Critical ontology is a phrase used elsewhere. For example as the branch of philosophy that studies what it means to be in the world, to be human.   Our use of "critical" has nothing to do with critical studies or critical theory or any of its derivatives. Critical in this blog means a stance or approach that examines theories, claims and proposals for consistency and correspondence with the facts together with a recognition that there is always the possibility of error - comprehensive fallibilism.

In addition to critical historical investigation ontology needs some terminology and structure. Hartmann's concepts of heterogeneous ontic spheres and strata provide a starting point for the investigations but they will not escape critique either.

Entities, Spheres and strata

The phrase What is as such will be taken as the point of departure. The term "entity" will be used for what is. An entity - purely as such, whatever it may be in its particulars - exists indifferently to whether it is known or not known, whether it is knowable or unknowable. Without entities there would be nothing to have properties, to make appearances nor to induce perceptions. The object is related to the entity and is used when the entity stands in relation to another entity. That is, it becomes an object through the relationship.

The philosophical task of organising what exists into categories can be traced back to Aristotle, at least, and `object' is a candidate for the category under which everything falls but so, perhaps, is `thing' or `entity'. Nominal definitions can only provide an arbitrary distinction between the terms to does not provide progress.  So, intuition from normal usage will provide guidance on the distinctions to be adopted:

• "Entity" will be used to designate that which exists as such. 
• "Thing" can designate a physical entity.
•  An "object" is an entity that has properties, and these properties appear in relation to other entities.

In physical theories the entities of interest will be objects. What is achieved by insisting on the "entity" is to stress that existence is not merely a matter of appearance. Appearance provides access to the object. This notion of appearance is interactional and reflexive. In particular quantum particles such as electrons, protons and positrons are objects. However, it is through their properties that they interact with other objects, and it is their properties that are observables in the sense of standard quantum mechanics.

The ontological structures introduced by Hartmann include: 

• The ideal and real spheres of being
• The layered structure of real being. 
• The Dasein and Sosein relationship.

A major purpose of Hartmann's ontology is to clarify the mistakes and pitfalls in idealism and realism. The "isms" will make the dogmatic claim that fundamentally everything is immaterial (Ideal) or everything physical (Real) or everything mind (Panpsychism). Critical ontology makes clear that there is no need follow either dogmatic path but claims it is wrong to identify the real with the material. The real sphere is much larger. 

The ideal sphere includes entities such a logic, mathematics, scientific theories. It is also the sphere where ethical and aesthetic values reside. The ideal and real spheres are not separate but different ways of being. It is a position going back to Plato than ideal being is superior to material being and more real because eternal. In contrast here the real (as set out below) is the ontological stronger sphere. They are distinguished in that everything real is individual, unique, destructible; whereas everything ideal is universal, returnable, always existing.

The real sphere consists of the natural world of common experience and its elaboration through scientific investigation. This sphere has four layers or strata (Schichten): inorganic, organic, psychic, and spiritual.  

• Inorganic stratum, with categories such as space, time, process, substance, is organised through causality.
• Organic stratum, with categories such as metabolism, assimilation, self-regulation, self-reproduction and adaptation, is organically organised - the peculiarity of the organic network is unrecognizable for the time being.
• Psychic stratum, with categories such as consciousness, pleasure, act and content. Equally unknown is the form of determination of mental acts. That is, we do not understand how mind works
• Spirit includes categories of fear, hope, will, freedom, thought, personality, but also society, historicity, or intersubjectivity. Its organisation principle is Finality ([6] page 58).

The term Geist originates from the German idealist tradition influenced by Hegel among others - as it is used, for example, in Geisteswissenschaft (Humanities)—and its meaning covers both individual mind as well as superindividual culture, which is why it lacks an adequate English translation. It should not be interpreted as in any religious sense here. In addition, "psychic" relates to mind and mental - no interpretation in terms of superstitious "psychic phenomena" is intended.

In the layered structure the organic builds on the inorganic and the psychic builds on the organic. It is only the system of categories that apply to them that distinguish the levels. The relationship between the strata and their categories requires systemic treatment and will be covered in a separate post. 

"Dasein" and "Sosein" 

"Dasein" and "Sosein" ("being there" and "being so" although the original German will be used in the following translation) are interacting ways of being in both spheres. This is illustrated by a quotation from Hartmann, [2] page 123:

Das Dasein des Baumes an seiner Stelle "ist" selbst ein Sosein des Waldes, der Wald wäre anders ohne ihn; das Dasein des Astes am Baum "ist" ein Sosein des Baumes; das Dasein des Blattes am Aste "ist" ein Sosein des Astes; das Dasein der Rippe im Blatt "ist" ein Sosein des Blattes. Diese Reihe läßt sich nach beiden Seiten verlängern; immer ist das Dasein des einen zugleich Sosein des anderen. Aber sie läßt sich auch umkehren: das Sosein des Blattes "ist" das Dasein der Rippe, das Sosein des Astes ist das Dasein des Blattes usf. Daß es immer nur ein Bruchstück des Soseins ist, das im Dasein von etwas anderem besteht, daran wird man hierbei keinen Anstoß nehmen dürfen. Denn es handelt sich gar nicht um die Vollständigkeit des Soseins. Wohl aber läßt sich sagen, daß auch die übrigen Bruchstücke des Soseins auf dieselbe Weise im Dasein von immer wieder anderem und anderem bestehen.

Translation

The Dasein of the tree in its place "is" itself a Sosein of the forest, the forest would be different without it; the Dasein of the branch on the tree "is" a Sosein of the tree; the Dasein of the leaf on the branch "is" a Sosein of the branch; the Dasein of the rib in the leaf "is" a Sosein of the leaf. This series can be extended to both sides; always the Dasein of one is at the same time Sosein of the other. But it can also be reversed: the Sosein of the leaf "is" the Dasein of the rib, the Sosein of the branch is the Dasein of the leaf, etc. That it is always only a fragment of the Soseins, which consists in the Dasein of something else, must not be taken negatively. Because it is not at all about the completeness of being. But it can be said that the other fragments of Sosein also exist in the repeating existence of always different and different things.

Conclusion

What Hartmann provides is not a philosophical system but a way of investigating being systematically.  It is critically constructive. Step by step, we can gain greater insight into the constituents of the world. In this blog topics will be tackled in physical and social science as well as philosophy where ambiguity over what exists or dogmatic positions risk hiding the nature of what there is and how it acts. For example, in physics, the status of space and time has been debated for millennia. Some claim that one or the other or both are illusory.  In economics homo economicus is often declared not to exist but can be found in many text books.  

It is the current debate on the foundations of quantum mechanics on the status of the wavefunction and the particle that rekindled my interest in ontological questions. So that will be the subject of the next and probably many other posts.

Hartmann's philosophy will provide the initial structure for the ontological investigations in this blog. A very useful and concise introduction to Hartmann's philosophy as whole is provided by Predrag Cicovacki in The Analysis of Wonder [7]. 

References

[1] Nicolai Hartmann. "Wie ist kritische Ontologie überhaupt möglich? Ein Kapitel zur Grundlegung der allgemeinen Kategorienlehre". In: Festschrift für Paul Natorp. Zum siebzigsten Geburtstage von Schülern und Freunden gewidmet (1924), pp. 124-177.

[2] Nicolai Hartmann. Zur Grundlegung der Ontologie. 4th ed. De Gruyter, 1948.

[3] Nicolai Hartmann. Möglichkeit und Wirklichkeit. 3rd ed. De Gruyter, 1937.

[4] Nicolai Hartmann. Der Aufbau der realen Welt. 3rd. De Gruyter, 1939. 

[5] Nicolai Hartmann. Philosophie der Natur. 2nd ed. De Gruyter, 1949.

[6] Nicolai Hartmann. Neue Wege der Ontologie. 3rd ed. W Kohlhammer, 1949.

[7] Predrag Cicovacki. The analysis of wonder: an introduction to the philosophy of Nicolai Hartmann. Bloomsbury, 2014