Monday 13 June 2022

The ontology of dispositions

 The motivation for analysing the ontology of dispositions is to understand partial causes and objective chance. It is objective chance that is the stronger interest here, motivated by wanting to understand the behaviour of basic entities at the inorganic ontic level. That is, entities that fall within the remit of quantum physics.

 Dispositional properties, as described by Anjum and Mumford [1], will be used to clarify how there can be properties of quantum entities that cause quantifiable property values to appear and influence other objects. This will develop into a dispositional understanding of probabilities in quantum mechanics.

While it is easy to appreciate dispositional properties intuitively it can be harder to make the concept precise enough to be useful in constructing a scientific theory. To help the following definitions will be used: 

Definition 1

A disposition is a property (such as solubility, fragility, elasticity) whose actualisation entails that the thing which has the property would change, or bring about some change, under certain conditions. 

Definition 2

A dispositional power is a physically existing dispositional property of an entity. 

In everyday use to say that some object is soluble is to say that it would dissolve if put in some liquid. To say that something is fragile is to say that it would break if, for instance, dropped in suitable circumstances; to say that something is elastic is to say that it would stretch when pulled. The fragility (solubility, elasticity) is a disposition; the breaking (dissolving, stretching) is the actualisation of the disposition. These examples are intuitively uncontroversial, but position and momentum are not classical dispositional properties of a particle. Results such as that of Kochen and Specker [2] show that the quantum situation is more subtle than dispositional properties such as solubility and elasticity because they demonstrate a contradiction in assuming that it is possible to assign simultaneously values to all observable properties in all states. Their result, although called a paradox in their paper, indicates the need for an ontology that deals with this more subtle reality. 

There is still ongoing debate about the nature of dispositions and key elements of this debate are outlined in Mumford [3]. However, the application in physics makes the ontology of causal powers the more attractive interpretation of the nature of dispositions [4].  These powers exist and can be independent of an observer. 

With the motivation to provide an objective interpretation of chance in quantum mechanics Popper [5], [6] took a significant step towards a theory of dispositional properties. He took the position that quantum mechanics is a statistical description of the behaviour of physical entitles and introduced dispositional properties through his propensity interpretation of probability:

 ...waves (even those of the second quantization) are mathematical representations of propensities, or of dispositional properties, of the physical situation (such as the experimental set-up), interpretable as propensities of the particles to take up certain states. 

Popper proposed that the wave aspect of quantum mechanics determines the tendency of the particles to assume specific states under certain conditions but with the strength of this disposition given by a probably. However, Popper developed his thinking prior to the demonstration that it is impossible, in general, to assign intrinsic values to all observable properties in all states and he did not completely develop the ontological consequences. Popper remained committed to a physics in which particles have properties that take values as in classical physics but that the quantum theory provides a statistical description of that reality.  

It is proposed here that properties of a physical entity need not all take values simultaneously for them to be physically existing properties. Dispositional properties are properties that govern how the entity tends to appear in various contexts. For example, a separate physical system may be of the form that couples to an electron's spin in a specific direction and instantiate a value for it. That would be how the electron spin appears to that system. 

In the dispositional theory developed in this blog there are properties, objective causal powers, and in addition the probabilistic appearance of the properties as property values.  The concepts required to clarify what is meant by `to exist' and `to have a property' are set out in "Why critical ontology?" and Fields of Sense

Dispositional properties cannot themselves appear in a Field of Sense, but their effects can.  This is the point where the modification of the Field of Sense ontology is used that recognises that there are properties of objects that affect appearances but do not themselves appear. This modification means that Fields of Sense do not provide a complete ontology, contrary to what seems to be proposed by Markus Gabriel.

A dispositional property such as fragility appears if the fragile object breaks, on falling from a table, for example. This is how it appears in a domestic Field of Sense. The fragile object, for example a porcelain cup, exits and appears in the domestic scene even if it does not break. It also has properties that are not dispositional for example it has a mass. So, an object can have non-dispositional properties that pin it down in a context. The electron has the properties of charge and (rest) mass that pins it down in the physical universe in which it has, as will be explained elsewhere, dispositional spin, position, and momentum. 

So, the position taken on the ontology of dispositions is:

  • Physical objects have at least one property that appears or causes a value to appear in some Field of Sense. 
  • Dispositional powers cause property values to appear in Fields of Sense.
  • Physical dispositions are properties of some physical objects.


[1] Rani Lill Anjum and Stephen Mumford. What Tends to Be. The Philosophy of Dispositional Modality. Routledge, 2018.

[2] Simon Kochen and Ernst P. Specker. The Problem of Hidden Variables in Quantum Mechanics. In: J. Math. & Mech. 17 (1967), p. 59.

[3] Stephen Mumford. Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Dispositions. 2011.

[4] Rani Lill Anjum and Stephen Mumford. Causation in Science and the Methods of Scientific Discovery. Oxford University Press, 2018.

[5] Karl R. Popper. Quantum Mechanics without 'The Observer'. In: Quantum Theory a
nd Reality. Ed. by Mario Bunge. New York: Springer-Verlag, 1967, p. 32.

[6] Karl R. Popper. Quantum Theory and the Schism in Physics. Unwin Hyrnan Ltd, 1982.

[7] Markus Gabriel. Fields of Sense. A New Realist Ontology. Edinburgh University, 2015.

Sunday 5 June 2022

Fields of Sense

 Within the layers and spheres described in Hartmann's architecture for critical ontology there is scope for introducing further structure. A Field of Sense [1] is an organisational concept that can be employed within a layer or within a sphere. It will be seen below that within the critical ontology adopted from Hartmann that Gabriel's full ontology cannot be accepted but a Field of Sense remains as a useful structure.

A Field of Sense is a domain in which objects appear in relationship to each other. How objects relate to each other depends on the properties that they have. Take, for example, the tendency for a cube of ice to melt while lying on a table in a warm living room. In this example, the living room is a Field of Sense in which the table, the warm air and the ice cube appear. The living room itself can in turn be an object in a Field of Sense such as a house. In `the house' Field of Sense the living room can have the properties of being warm and having a table in it.

For Gabriel the mode of existence of an object and its properties depends on the Field of Sense that grants that mode. In that ontology, to exist is for something to appear in a Field of Sense, roughly; to exist is to belong to a domain in which objects appear.

The notion of sense here is developed by Gabriel from that of Frege [2], whose use of `sense' is close to grasping the meaning of the term when restricting considerations to a concept. It is generalised by Gabriel to grasping how an object appears in the context that makes that appearance possible. This grasping is generalised further to being affected by the appearance of an object. This form of `grasping' need not be cognitive. To use the example Frege employs; the morning star and evening star are two senses of the proper name Venus. Frege uses epistemological terms, but these can be reinterpreted ontologically, as follows. The existent thing, Venus, can appear in two senses, as the morning star and as the evening star. There are, of course, many other ways for Venus to appear. The object Venus viewed from the earth in the morning is the morning star. The morning star exists. Existence for Gabriel is not found immediately in the world but in one of many domains. Such a domain is a Field of Sense. There are many such domains, a potentially uncountable infinity. Things make sense and are sensed in such a domain.

For Gabriel the world (the systematic totality of all that exists) is the Field of Sense of all Fields of Sense. His negative result (that the world does not exist) depends on this notion. The Field of Sense ontology may be organised compactly as follows,

  • Existence implies that properties appear in a Field of Sense 
  • A sense is the way in which an object appears. 
  • A Field of Sense can be an object in yet another Field of Sense.
  • A Field of Sense must contain objects and cannot consist exclusively of a single object because an object could not then appear because appearance is always in relationship to something.
  • The world cannot be an object in a Field of Sense otherwise it would appear in a field larger than the world. 
    • But to exist is to appear in a Field of Sense. 
    • Therefore, The world does not exist.
  • The physical universe, people, scientific theories, characters in novels, and films all exist in at least one Field of Sense.
  • Fields of Sense are differentiated by reference (as developed by Frege [2]). 
    • Reference enables recognition of the Field of Sense in which objects are appearing. For example, it would be a reference mistake to identify your family life with a TV play, but it would not be a reference mistake to use it as a metaphor.

Although this has a form of a useful and in many ways enlightening organisational scheme it assumes that existence implies appearance or even the stronger claim that existence is appearance [3]. Although all objects of interest to physical science will appear in a Field of Sense there is no compelling reason to think that all entities must appear in a field of sense or that appearance exhausts what is meant by existing. There may be entities that are inaccessible, that leave no trace. There may be entities that have no scope to appear per se and the world, as the systematic totality of all that exists, is a candidate to be such an entity. From these considerations a modification of the scheme above is proposed:

  • The properties of all objects appear in a Field of Sense
  • A sense is the way in which an object appears. 
  • A Field of Sense can be an object in yet another Field of Sense.
  • A Field of Sense must contain objects and cannot consist exclusively of a single object because an object could not then appear because appearance is always in relationship to something.
  • The world cannot be an object in a Field of Sense otherwise it would appear in a field larger than the world. 
    • But to be an object is to appear in a Field of Sense.
    • Therefore, the world is not an object.
  • The physical universe, people, scientific theories, characters in novels, and films all exist in at least one Field of Sense.
  • Fields of Sense are differentiated by reference.
    • Reference enables recognition of the Field of Sense in which objects are appearing.

So, the headline result of Gabriel's ontological analysis (The World does not Exist) is gone and replace by "The World is not an Object". This is not in any way paradoxal because an entity becomes and object in relation to another outside entity and for the world there is no such entity.

Fields of Sense allow aspects of ontological investigation to be pursued within and across Hartmann's strata and in in both ontic spheres.

[1] Markus Gabriel. Fields of Sense. A New Realist Ontology. Edinburgh University, 2015.

[2] Gottlob Frege. Funktion, Begriff, Bedeutung: Fünf logische Studien. Ed. by Günther Patzig. Hubert & Co, 1962.

[3] Markus Gabriel. Fiktionen. Suhrkamp Verlag, 2020.

Comparison of quantum physical ontologies

In discussing ontology in physics both the real and ideal spheres, as introduced by Nicolai Hartmann, play a role. The pure mathematics, applied to construct theory, is in the ideal sphere and the physical entities are in the real sphere. For example, self-adjoint operators exist in quantum theory and they represent observables (properties of things) that exist (this is claimed as a truth) in the physical world. However, it must always be kept in mind that truth claims are fallible.

The ontologies discussed in this post are proposals for what exists and does not exist in real sphere interpretations of several formulations of quantum mechanics. These proposals are to be contrasted with the aspect of critical ontology that provides the structures for the investigation. A guiding statement, in the spirit of critical ontology, for this investigation, is that by Maudlin [1]:

A physical theory should clearly and forthrightly address two fundamental questions: what there is, and what it does.

This section explores a range of options on `what there is' in theories that seek to produce identical or very similar empirical results. If the empirical results were not in agreement, then those theories that did not agree with experiment would be eliminated as not being true, although they could still be of theoretical interest. It is because theories with radically different existence claims can have the same empirical consequences that ontology investigation is interesting and relevant.

In what follows familiarity with standard quantum physics, as taught to physics undergraduates, is assumed. If a reminder is needed then Jennan Ismael’s contribution to The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy [2] may be helpful.

In the multi-strata model of the real, the discussion that follows deals with physical entities in the inorganic layer. The theories are creations than reside in the objective part of the spiritual layer. There are theories that involve the psychic layer but they will not be considered in this post. The psychic layer can only come into play if there is someone there to have perceptions and thoughts.

Wavefunction ontology

In standard quantum physics the wavefunction permits a range of possible events. Of the possible events one happens due to a measurement process. But what happens - what is the physics - when there is no measurement? Ghirardi, Rimini and Weber [3], (GRW) introduced a supplementary physical effect to standard quantum mechanics that randomly causes the collapse of the wavefunction, creating a way of obtaining macroscopic events from microscopic quantum systems, as will be explained below.

Local beables

John Bell [4], uses his concept of local beables [5] to propose that theses random events are what give effect to local beables. Bell's local beables are a significant development as it was a move away from focusing on what is observed to what exists. The locality of the beable, however, is still tied to the observation that particles such as electrons or photons appear locally in experimental situations. `Beable' also implies a process of coming into being. So, a particle may exist in an interaction or detection but what of the existence of the particle as such? The concept of local beables in general leaves such questions unanswered. The application to GRW will now be considered.

The GRW mechanism is as follows. Let the initial the wave function be

\[\psi (t, q_1, q_2, \dots, q_N)\]

where \(t\) is time and \(q_1, q_2, \dots, q_N\) are position coordinates. The probability per unit time for a GRW spontaneous collapse event is \(N/\tau\), where \(\tau\) is a new constant of nature, chosen to be  in the order of \(10^{14}\) seconds. The collapsed wavefunction is

\[\psi' = \frac{j(x - q_n ) \psi(t, \dots)}{R_n (x)},\]

where \(q_n\) is chosen at random (probability \(=1/N\))

The definition of the weighting function \(j\) introduces at least one further constant of nature. This is tuned to be in the region of \(10^{-5}\)cm to preserve the observed microscopic effects while generating the commonly observed macroscopic world. There is nothing but the wavefunction and the collapse is part of its dynamics.

However, the GRW collapse events happen to the wavefunction, not something else. The wavefunction is then well localized in ordinary space at, at most, a mesoscopic scale. Each is centred on a particular space-time point \((x, t)\). So, Bell proposes these events as providing the local beables of the theory. This would make the beables appearances of the object (Sosein) not a representation of the object itself (Dasein). That being so, these local beables are sparse events in a system of particles and would be very rare for a small number of particles. That is, in the time scales typical of experiment nothing would happen outside the detector. Entanglement provides the mechanism for the commonly experienced existence of macroscopic bodies such as detectors. Note that the spontaneous event is a reduction of the wavefunction. This leaves open the relationship to the charge, mass and spin carrying particle. In addition, if this spontaneously reduced wavefunction is what exists then its relation to the actual particle still needs explanation. Implicitly there is a return to Born probability mechanism but without clarity on this the ontology is incomplete.

Distributed charge and mass

An alternative wavefunction ontology, but still within GRW theory, proposes that the particle has only a ``fuzzy'' position, with ``more of it'' located in places that correspond to its location in configurations which are assigned high amplitudes by the wave-function. This suggests a picture in which the particle is “smeared out” in space, and the effect of the GRW hit is to concentrate most of the smear within \(10^{-5}\)cm of a particular location. In this ontology the charge and mass of an electron would presumably be distributed across the support of the wavefunction. This theory does propose that a particle exists as such and is extended in space. This therefore provides a more complete ontology. 

The multiverse

A third set of theories are a development of Everett's relative state formulation of quantum mechanics [6], that are commonly known as many worlds or multiverse interpretations. In this case just the evolving wavefunction features as the candidate entity. The wave function describes all the possibilities for the system and all possibilities happen.  This gives rise to many (an infinity of) physical worlds. Wallace [7] provides a comprehensive discussion of this set of theories.  

Everett’s criterion for the real existence of a branch is: If the wavefunction \(\psi\) of a system is a superposition \(a\phi+ b\theta\) then the “branches” \(\phi\) and \(\theta\) exist, and in each branch, everything physically exists that would exist if that were the entire state of the system. However, there are many ways to represent a function as a linear representation of other functions. Some further structure is required to provide a path to candidates for entities. One approach is an appeal to decoherence, achieved through entanglement. Here the quantity capturing possible states of affairs is \(|\psi|^2\) and entanglement can pick out specific decomposition that depends on the physics of the interaction

\[ |\psi |^2 \rightarrow |a\phi|^2+|b\theta|^2\]

That is, there is no interference term. However, the more detailed theory [7] works with approximate decoherence. 

Examining critically the ontology of many worlds, it shares some of the issues with the GRW theory, especially in the Bell beables version. The smeared, or extended particle interpretation is not available to it but a complete theory must show how familiar phenomena emerge. According to Wallace [7] 

[A] macro-object is a pattern, and the existence of a pattern as a real thing depends on the usefulness--in particular the explanatory power and predictive reliability--of theories which admit that pattern in their ontology.

What makes a collection of electrons, protons, and neutrons a particle accelerator, rather than something else, has to do with how the microscopic parts are arranged, or structured. A significant part of that structure is the spatial arrangement of the microscopic parts through time. However, a quantum wavefunction contains no microscopic parts localized in space-time, so its behaviour cannot create a macroscopic particle accelerator in anything like the way the behaviour of localized electrons, neutrons, and protons can. The problem remains of how to populate familiar space-time with locally existing entities.

Bohmian ontology

Bohmian mechanics [8], [9], is a formulation of quantum mechanics that is constructed to give the same results as that of standard quantum mechanics but in which particles have continuous trajectories.  For a discussion of the theory's ontology the mathematics of how this is accomplished is not relevant. The ontology includes: 

  • Particles with a well-defined position x(t) which varies continuously and is causally determined.
  • A guiding field that is derived from the solution of Schrödinger's equation, so that it too changes continuously and is causally determined.
    • The particle is never separate from this guiding field that fundamentally affects it. There is no dynamics without this field.
    • The guiding eld is not affected by the particle. 

The Bohmian mechanics emphasises that the particle has a continuous trajectory and that these trajectories exist in the physical domain. The particle does not follow the laws of classical dynamics but is guided by a field that is directly derived from the solution to the Schrödinger equation. The claims made about what exists are not made within a wider ontology, but simply posit particles and guiding elds. It is tacitly assumed that to exist is to physically exist.

The distinction has been made between existing in the theory (the ideal sphere) and existing physically (the real sphere). There is a version Bohmian mechanics in which the guiding field is not in the real sphere of the ontology but in the ideal sphere. The guiding field is then a law governing the behaviour of the particle but not a physical entity like the particle. Allori [10] presents this as a primitive ontology. Allori claims that a physical theory

... will be about a given primitive ontology: entities living in three-dimensional space or in space-time. They are the fundamental building blocks of everything else, and their histories through time provide a picture of the world according to the theory (the scientific image).

These primitive variables describe what exists in the inorganic layer of the real sphere whereas non-primitive variables exist in the physical theories in the ideal sphere. In a physical situation where no person is active there is no mechanism for the ideal sphere to influence the real sphere. The primitive ontology must therefore include the guiding field so that Bohmian mechanics can operate as a fully-fledged physical theory. However, the wavefunction that gives rise to the guiding field is a function on configuration space, rather than the three-dimensional space of natural phenomena.

Conclusion

Critical ontology, as an investigative method, has now been applied to a range of proposals that claim the physical existence of particle or wavefunctions or both. Of these it is Bohmian mechanics, with particles and guiding fields as physical entities, that provides the most near to complete physical ontology.

A major deficiency in GRW theories is that the ontological status of the spontaneous reduction of the wavefunction. The mathematical description is of a stochastic process but it is not clear what this process is a property of.  This will need a discussion of dispositional properties.

References

[1] Tim Maudlin. (2019) Philosophy of Physics: Quantum Theory. Princeton University Press., 2019.

[2] Jenann Ismael. Quantum Mechanics. In: The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Ed. by Edward N. Zalta. Fall 2021. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University, 2021.

[3] G. C. Ghirardi, A. Rimini, and T. Weber. Unified dynamics for microscopic and macroscopic systems. In: Phys. Rev. D 34 (2 July 1986), pp. 470491.

[4] John S. Bell. Are there quantum jumps? In: Speakable and Unspeakable in Quantum Mechanics: Collected Papers on Quantum Philosophy. 2nd ed. Cambridge University Press, 2004, pp. 201212.

[5] John S. Bell. The theory of local beables. In: Speakable and Unspeakable in Quantum Mechanics: Collected Papers on Quantum Philosophy. 2nd ed. Cambridge University Press, 2004, pp. 52-62.

[6] Hugh Everett. “Relative State" Formulation of Quantum Mechanics. In: Rev. Mod. Phys. 29 (3 July 1957), pp. 454-462.

[7] David Wallace. The Emergent Multiverse: Quantum Theory according to the Everett Interpretation. Oxford University Press, 2012.

[8] David Bohm and Basil Hiley. The Undivided Universe. 1st ed. Taylor and Francis, 2006.

[9] Detlef Dürr and Stefan Teufel. Bohmian Mechanics: The Physics and Mathematics of Quantum Theory. Springer-Verlag, 2009.

[10] Valia Allori. Primitive Ontology and the Structure of Fundamental Physical Theories. In: The Wave Function: Essays in the Metaphysics of Quantum Mechanics. Ed. by Alyssa Ney and David Z. Albert. Oxford University Press, 2013.

Monday 30 May 2022

Why critical ontology?

"The 'being' of things is indifferent to whatever things might be 'for someone'."


Nicolai Hartmann asked "How is a critical ontology at all possible?" [1].  He was writing at a time when metaphysics was under attack or being dismissed as irrelevant. Part of his answer was that ontology, properly structured, is more like a a science of what exists than speculative metaphysics. But what purpose does it serve? The short answer is that critical ontology is a way of investigating what exists and how it exists and that this must be considered before investigating how things behave. Hartmann's writings on ontology [2], [3], [4], [5], developed the answer further. In addition to taking seriously the phenomena of normal life and natural science, he examines in detail the history of ontology. Hartmann's critical historical examination, ranging from the pre-socratics to his contemporaries such as Heidegger, leads him to classify many approaches as mistaken in not addressing existence as such but merely the appearance or knowledge of things or packing everything in the realm of ideas or physical substance.

Critical ontology is a phrase used elsewhere. For example as the branch of philosophy that studies what it means to be in the world, to be human.   Our use of "critical" has nothing to do with critical studies or critical theory or any of its derivatives. Critical in this blog means a stance or approach that examines theories, claims and proposals for consistency and correspondence with the facts together with a recognition that there is always the possibility of error - comprehensive fallibilism.

In addition to critical historical investigation ontology needs some terminology and structure. Hartmann's concepts of heterogeneous ontic spheres and strata provide a starting point for the investigations but they will not escape critique either.

Entities, Spheres and strata

The phrase What is as such will be taken as the point of departure. The term "entity" will be used for what is. An entity - purely as such, whatever it may be in its particulars - exists indifferently to whether it is known or not known, whether it is knowable or unknowable. Without entities there would be nothing to have properties, to make appearances nor to induce perceptions. The object is related to the entity and is used when the entity stands in relation to another entity. That is, it becomes an object through the relationship.

The philosophical task of organising what exists into categories can be traced back to Aristotle, at least, and `object' is a candidate for the category under which everything falls but so, perhaps, is `thing' or `entity'. Nominal definitions can only provide an arbitrary distinction between the terms to does not provide progress.  So, intuition from normal usage will provide guidance on the distinctions to be adopted:

  • "Entity" will be used to designate that which exists as such. 
  • "Thing" can designate a physical entity.
  •  An "object" is an entity that has properties, and these properties appear in relation to other entities.
In physical theories the entities of interest will be objects. What is achieved by insisting on the "entity" is to stress that existence is not merely a matter of appearance. Appearance provides access to the object. This notion of appearance is interactional and reflexive. In particular quantum particles such as electrons, protons and positrons are objects. However, it is through their properties that they interact with other objects, and it is their properties that are observables in the sense of standard quantum mechanics.

The ontological structures introduced by Hartmann include: 

  • The ideal and real spheres of being
  • The layered structure of real being. 
  • The Dasein and Sosein relationship.

A major purpose of Hartmann's ontology is to clarify the mistakes and pitfalls in idealism and realism. The "isms" will make the dogmatic claim that fundamentally everything is immaterial (Ideal) or everything physical (Real) or everything mind (Panpsychism). Critical ontology makes clear that there is no need follow either dogmatic path but claims it is wrong to identify the real with the material. The real sphere is much larger. 

The ideal sphere includes entities such a logic, mathematics, scientific theories. It is also the sphere where ethical and aesthetic values reside. The ideal and real spheres are not separate but different ways of being. It is a position going back to Plato than ideal being is superior to material being and more real because eternal. In contrast here the real (as set out below) is the ontological stronger sphere. They are distinguished in that everything real is individual, unique, destructible; whereas everything ideal is universal, returnable, always existing.

The real sphere consists of the natural world of common experience and its elaboration through scientific investigation. This sphere has four layers or strata (Schichten): inorganic, organic, psychic, and spiritual.  

  • Inorganic stratum, with categories such as space, time, process, substance, is organised through causality.
  • Organic stratum, with categories such as metabolism, assimilation, self-regulation, self-reproduction and adaptation, is organically organised - the peculiarity of the organic network is unrecognizable for the time being.
  • Psychic stratum, with categories such as consciousness, pleasure, act and content. Equally unknown is the form of determination of mental acts. That is, we do not understand how mind works
  • Spirit includes categories of fear, hope, will, freedom, thought, personality, but also society, historicity, or intersubjectivity. Its organisation principle is Finality ([6] page 58).

The term Geist originates from the German idealist tradition influenced by Hegel among others - as it is used, for example, in Geisteswissenschaft (Humanities)—and its meaning covers both individual mind as well as superindividual culture, which is why it lacks an adequate English translation. It should not be interpreted as in any religious sense here. In addition, "psychic" relates to mind and mental - no interpretation in terms of superstitious "psychic phenomena" is intended.

In the layered structure the organic builds on the inorganic and the psychic builds on the organic. It is only the system of categories that apply to them that distinguish the levels. The relationship between the strata and their categories requires systemic treatment and will be covered in a separate post. 

"Dasein" and "Sosein" 

"Dasein" and "Sosein" ("being there" and "being so" although the original German will be used in the following translation) are interacting ways of being in both spheres. This is illustrated by a quotation from Hartmann, [2] page 123:

Das Dasein des Baumes an seiner Stelle "ist" selbst ein Sosein des Waldes, der Wald wäre anders ohne ihn; das Dasein des Astes am Baum "ist" ein Sosein des Baumes; das Dasein des Blattes am Aste "ist" ein Sosein des Astes; das Dasein der Rippe im Blatt "ist" ein Sosein des Blattes. Diese Reihe läßt sich nach beiden Seiten verlängern; immer ist das Dasein des einen zugleich Sosein des anderen. Aber sie läßt sich auch umkehren: das Sosein des Blattes "ist" das Dasein der Rippe, das Sosein des Astes ist das Dasein des Blattes usf. Daß es immer nur ein Bruchstück des Soseins ist, das im Dasein von etwas anderem besteht, daran wird man hierbei keinen Anstoß nehmen dürfen. Denn es handelt sich gar nicht um die Vollständigkeit des Soseins. Wohl aber läßt sich sagen, daß auch die übrigen Bruchstücke des Soseins auf dieselbe Weise im Dasein von immer wieder anderem und anderem bestehen.

Translation

The Dasein of the tree in its place "is" itself a Sosein of the forest, the forest would be different without it; the Dasein of the branch on the tree "is" a Sosein of the tree; the Dasein of the leaf on the branch "is" a Sosein of the branch; the Dasein of the rib in the leaf "is" a Sosein of the leaf. This series can be extended to both sides; always the Dasein of one is at the same time Sosein of the other. But it can also be reversed: the Sosein of the leaf "is" the Dasein of the rib, the Sosein of the branch is the Dasein of the leaf, etc. That it is always only a fragment of the Soseins, which consists in the Dasein of something else, must not be taken negatively. Because it is not at all about the completeness of being. But it can be said that the other fragments of Sosein also exist in the repeating existence of always different and different things.

Conclusion

What Hartmann provides is not a philosophical system but a way of investigating being systematically.  It is critically constructive. Step by step, we can gain greater insight into the constituents of the world. In this blog topics will be tackled in physical and social science as well as philosophy where ambiguity over what exists or dogmatic positions risk hiding the nature of what there is and how it acts. For example, in physics, the status of space and time has been debated for millennia. Some claim that one or the other or both are illusory.  In economics homo economicus is often declared not to exist but can be found in many text books.  

It is the current debate on the foundations of quantum mechanics on the status of the wavefunction and the particle that rekindled my interest in ontological questions. So that will be the subject of the next and probably many other posts.

Hartmann's philosophy will provide the initial structure for the ontological investigations in this blog. A very useful and concise introduction to Hartmann's philosophy as whole is provided by Predrag Cicovacki in The Analysis of Wonder [7]. 

References

[1] Nicolai Hartmann. "Wie ist kritische Ontologie überhaupt möglich? Ein Kapitel zur Grundlegung der allgemeinen Kategorienlehre". In: Festschrift für Paul Natorp. Zum siebzigsten Geburtstage von Schülern und Freunden gewidmet (1924), pp. 124-177.

[2] Nicolai Hartmann. Zur Grundlegung der Ontologie. 4th ed. De Gruyter, 1948.

[3] Nicolai Hartmann. Möglichkeit und Wirklichkeit. 3rd ed. De Gruyter, 1937.

[4] Nicolai Hartmann. Der Aufbau der realen Welt. 3rd. De Gruyter, 1939. 

[5] Nicolai Hartmann. Philosophie der Natur. 2nd ed. De Gruyter, 1949.

[6] Nicolai Hartmann. Neue Wege der Ontologie. 3rd ed. W Kohlhammer, 1949.

[7] Predrag Cicovacki. The analysis of wonder: an introduction to the philosophy of Nicolai Hartmann. Bloomsbury, 2014

The heart of the matter